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ENTRAPMENT VERSUS DUE PROCESS:
A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE
CRIMINAL CONVICTION OBTAINED BY
LAW ENFORCEMENT MISCONDUCT
Peter J. O'Connor*
I. Introduction
Fifty years ago, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States,' Justice Brandeis condemned criminal convictions ob-
tained by means of law enforcement misconduct in strong and mov-
ing language. He stated:2
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall
be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
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1. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
2. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). By a vote of five to four, the Court held that
interception of telephone conversations does not contravene the fourth amendment guaran-
tee against unlawful search and seizure. Justice Brandeis characterized wiretapping by
government agents as a violation of the right of privacy protected by the government. Olin-
stead was specifically overruled by the United Staten Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which held that FBI interception of conversations in a telephone
booth by means of a concealed microphone without a warrant violated the fourth amendment.
See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The fourth amendment provides that "[tihe
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Today, eaves.
dropping is subject not only to the constraints of the fourth amendment, but also to the
stringent requirements of federal statute. New York State possesses an analogue of the federal
statute. N.Y. Cam. PRoc. LAw art. 700 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1977).
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it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the ends justifies the means-to declare 'that the government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should reso-
lutely set its face.
Several years after Justice Brandeis' condemnation of govern-
ment lawlessness, the Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of
entrapment in Sorrells v. United States.' Entrapment was calcu-
lated to overturn a criminal conviction obtained by a certain type
of police misconduct. All members of the Court agreed that the
doctrine involved government instigation of the commission of a
crime by an accused.' The majority held that entrapment could only
occur when the accused was not predisposed to commit the crime
charged; the minority, although agreeing in the result, took the
position that the accused's predisposition was irrelevant to the
determination of the issue of entrapment.'
In the decades following Sorrells, the entrapment issue concerned
the Court in three cases.' On each occasion, a majority of the Court
reaffirmed the Sorrells majority formulation that entrapment is not
available as a defense to an accused who was predisposed to commit
the crime charged.7 In 1973, a majority of the Court held that, al-
though the accused may have been predisposed, if his conviction
3. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The Court has held the defense of
entrapment does not rest on constitutional grounds. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1976). The basis of the defense is discussed in the text accompanying notes 18 and 20 infra.
Entrapment is not the only doctrine used by the United States Supreme Court to reach law
enforcement misconduct. For example, where the police obtain a confession from an accused
in violation of his rights under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, the
confession is inadmissible in a criminal trial of the accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). The fifth amendment provides: "[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has also
utilized the fourth amendment of the Constitution as a vehicle to reach police misconduct.
Specifically, evidence seized by the police in violation of the fourth amendment may not be
used in a criminal trial against the accused whose rights have been violated. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Eavesdropping has been subjected to fourth amendment strictures by
the Court. See note 1 supra. Under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, the Court has ruled that evidence of pre-trial identification of the accused
violative of due process may not be lawfully used in the subsequent criminal trial. Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
4. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See-text accompanying notes 14-22
infra.
5. Id.
6. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
7. Id.
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were obtained by fundamentally unfair police methods, due process
would require reversal of the conviction.' However, in 1976, a plural-
ity of the Court held that conviction of a predisposed accused would
not be reversed on due process grounds unless police conduct vio-
lated some "protected right" of the accused.'
In contrast to the uncertain status of due process as an alternative
to entrapment at the federal level, the New York Court of Appeals
has recently held that due process is the rubric to be applied to law
enforcement conduct and has defined the due process criteria to be
applied. 0 In this article, the Supreme Court's formulation of the
entrapment doctrine and its ambiguous enunciation of a due process
alternative will be examined;" New York's entrapment doctrine and
that State's formulation of a due process alternative will next be
examined; l" and, finally, critical comments as to the present and
future state of the law in both jurisdictions will be offered."
II. The United States Supreme Court View of Entrapment
and the Due Process Alternative
In 1932, Sorrells v. United States" presented the United States
Supreme Court with its first opportunity to recognize entrapment
as a defense to a criminal charge." In a unanimous decision, the
8. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
9. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
10. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
11. See text accompanying notes 14-60 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 61-84 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 85-104 infra.
14. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
15. The defense was recognized in England in 1754. The King v. Macdaniel, 168 Eng.
Rep. 124 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1754), held that no robbery occurred when several persons pro-
cured others to rob one of that number in order to collect a reward. In 1878, Michigan rec-
ognized the defense upon the following rationale:
If we cannot assist another and prevent him from violating the laws of the land, we
at least should abstain from any active efforts in the way of leading him into tempta-
tion. Desire to commit crime and opportunity for the commission thereof would seem
sufficiently general and numerous, and no special efforts would seem necessary in the
way of encouragement or assistance in that direction.
Michigan v. Saunders, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878).
New York rejected entrapment as a defense in 1904, on the theory that "[the courts do
not look to see who held out the bait, but to see who took it." People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274,
289, 70 N.E. 786, 791 (1904). Prior to 1967, New York was one of the few states which did not
recognize entrapment as a defense. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.05 (McKinney 1975) (practice
commentary). Since 1967, entrapment has been a statutory defense in New York. N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 40.05 (McKinney 1975). See note 73 infra. For a general history of entrapment, see
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Court reversed the defendant's conviction for possession and sale
of illegal whiskey to an undercover government agent.'" The agent
persistently solicited the defendant to obtain whiskey for sale to
the agent. Although unanimously agreeing that the conduct of the
agent constituted entrapment, the members of the Court disagreed
as to the basis for and definition of entrapment. 7
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes defined entrapment
as the instigation of crime by government agents through persuasion
or fraud. 8 Under such circumstances, according to the Chief Jus-
tice, the government is estopped from prosecuting the accused for
the crime. The predisposition of the accused to commit the crime
charged was critical to the doctrine as formulated by the Chief
Justice."° If the accused were predisposed to commit the crime, he
was not entrapped into its commission. Consequently, the Chief
Justice's formulation of the doctrine involved a subjective standard.
Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, defined entrapment as
the conception and planning of a crime by a government agent,
and his procurement of its commission by a person who would not
have committed the crime but for the trickery or fraud of the
agent.2' While the Chief Justice's formulation was based upon the
DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and
Application, 1 U.S.F. L. Rzv. 243 (1967).
16. 287 U.S. at 452.
17. Id. The Court divided by a vote of 6-3 upon the definition and basis of entrapment.
18. Id. at 441, 445, 448 & 451. The Chief Justice stated:
It is well settled that decoys may be used to entrap criminals, and to present
opportunity to one intending or willing to commit crime. But decoys are not permissi-
ble to ensnare the innocent and law-abiding into the commission of crime. When the
criminal design originates, not-with the accused but is conceived, in the mind of
government officers, and the accused is by persuasion, deceitful representation, or
inducement lured into the commission of a criminal act, the government is estopped
by sound public policy from prosecution therefor.
Id. at 445.
19. Id. at 445.
20. Id. at 451. The Chief Justice stated:
For the defense of entrapment is not simply that the particular act was committed at
the instance of government officials. That is often the case where the proper action of
these officials leads to the revelation of criminal enterprises . . . .The predisposition
and criminal design of the defendant are relevant. But the issues raised and the
evidence adduced must be pertinent to the controlling question whether the defendant
is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an
alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.
Id. at 451.
21. Id. at 454. Justice Roberts stated: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an
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accused's predisposition, Justice Roberts made no mention of it.
In Justice Roberts' view, the predicate for the doctrine is not
estoppel but rather the protection of the judicial process from
abuse." The disagreement between the Chief Justice and Justice
Roberts was to surface in the next entrapment case before the
Court.Y
In 1958, entrapment was again an issue before the Court in
Sherman v. United States." Sherman involved the conviction of a
defendant for three sales of drugs to an undercover agent who had
persistently solicited the defendant to obtain drugs for sale to the
agent. As in SorreIls,21 the Court unanimously agreed that the con-
viction should be reversed based on entrapment but disagreed as to
precisely what constituted entrapment .2
On behalf of a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Warren reiter-
ated former Chief Justice Hughes' doctrine in Sorrells emphasiz-
ing the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime." Citing
Justice Roberts' opinion in Sorrells, Justice Frankfurter, in a con-
curring opinion, argued that the focus of entrapment should not be
the accused's predisposition but rather the conduct of the police.28
The standard would be an objective one: police conduct would not
constitute entrapment where such conduct would influence only
those ready and willing to commit crime .2 While both Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Frankfurter agreed that entrapment included
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Id.
22. Id. at 457. Justice Roberts stated:
The doctrine rests. . . on a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its
own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the
court. It is the province of the court and of the court 'alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal law.
Id.
23. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
24. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
25. 287 U.S. 435 (1933).
26. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The Court divided by a vote of five to four with respect to the
definition and basis of entrapment.
27. Id. at 370, 372-73, 376-78.
28. Id. at 380, 384-85.
29. Id. For a criticism of Justice Frankfurter's view of entrapment, see DeFeo, Entrap-
ment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F.
L. REv. 243, 275-76 (1967). Mr. DeFeo argues that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's entrapment
formulation would result in an increase in acquittals which "seems a luxury better not in-
dulged in our present condition of social insecurity." Id. at 275.
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police instigation of crime, the Chif Justice's test was a subjective
one: the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. Jus-
tice Frankfurter's test was an objective one, whether or not the
police conduct was likely to induce only those of a criminal bent to
commit the crime. In short, Justice Frankfurter expressly stated
what had been implied in Justice Roberts' opinion that entrap-
ment involves an objective appraisal of police conduct. 30
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court again faced the doc-
trine of entrapment in United States v. Russell."' By a divided vote,
the Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for manufacture and
sale of an illegal drug to a government agent. 2 The agent had pre-
viously supplied the defendant with an essential element of the
drug.-3 The trial judge, in submitting the case to the jury, had de-
fined the entrapment defense in the manner delineated by the Court
30. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra. Between 1958 and 1973, the doctrine was
not uniformly interpreted by the federal courts. See Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in
Federal Courts: Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L. J. 573, 580-90 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Murchison]. Most federal circuits treated the doctrine as focusing on the predisposition
of the defendant. See Murchison, supra at 588 n.97. Three of the circuit courts and one
district court rejected the use of the subjective test alone finding that entrapment had been
established solely by the improper conduct of government officials. For example, in United
States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970) the defendant was acquitted where a
federal agent supplied the accused with counterfeit money, the receipt of which was the
charge against him. Similarly in United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), appeal
after remand, 470 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973), the charge failed
where a government informer purchased heroin for the accused, who in turn sold it to a federal
agent, the sale of which was the charge against him. In Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
783 (9th Cir. 1971), a federal agent treated the accused "as partners," offered to supply them
with a still, a still site, still equipment, an operator and sugar. The charge of selling illegal
whiskey to the agent did not stand. United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972),
vacated, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973), opinion on remand, 494
F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974), held that where government agents infiltrated a counterfeiting
operation, arranged for and supervised the actual printing of the counterfeit bills, determined
how and when they would be delivered to defendant, and then immediately arrested him for
unlawful possession of counterfeit money a conviction could not be maintained.
. Between 1958 and 1973, almost all of legal literature on entrapment supported the objective
test. Murchison, supra at 580. For example, one commentator favored the objective test
because "the existing doctrine is inadequate to curb effectively disapproved practices." Com-
ment, Criminal Law-Entrapment by Federal Officers, 33 N.Y. L. Rav. 1033, 1041 (1958). But
see note 29 supra.
31. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
32. Id. at 425-27.
33. Id.
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in Sorrel1s 3 and Sherman,35 thereby focusing on respondent's pre-
disposition to commit the crime charged.3 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed based upon "an intolerable degree of government participa-
tion in the criminal enterprise. ' 37 The court held that reversal was
mandated relying upon fundamental concepts of due process and a
"reluctance of the judiciary to countenance 'overzealous law en-
forcement.' -13
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit." Writing for the
majority of the Court, Justice Rehnquist, after noting that the re-
spondent had conceded on appeal that the jury "could have found
him predisposed to commit the offenses .... "40 reaffirmed the
entrapment doctrine as formulated by the majority in Sorrells and
Sherman," and rejected the respondent's claim that the entrapment
defense is a constitutional right.'" The Court found that no
"independent constitutional right" of the respondent had been vio-
lated, that the undercover agent had not violated any federal or
state statute or rule, and that the agent had not committed any
crime. .
Significantly, Justice Rehnquist then went on to state:"
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
34. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
35. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
36. 411 U.S. 427 n.4.
37. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
38. 459 F.2d at 674.
39. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). The vote was five to four.
40. 411 U.S. at 427.
41. Id. at 432-34. Justice Rehnquist criticized the lower federal courts which had fo-
cused on government conduct as the test of entrapment. The entrapment doctrine "was not
intended to give the federal judiciary 'a chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices
which it did not approve." 411 U.S. at 435.
42. 411 U.S. at 430.
43. Id. In finding that no "independent constitutional right of the respondent had been
violated," the Court referred specifically to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where evi-
dence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was held not to be admissible in state
criminal trials. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), statements obtained from an
accused by custodial interrogation in violation of the fifth amendment were held inadmissible
in criminal trials.
44. 411 U.S. at 431-32. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part that "[nlo person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
19781
42 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed . . . . The law
enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that "fundamental
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice," mandated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Two of the dissenting Justices filed separate opinions based on
the view of entrapment expressed by Justices Roberts 5 and Frank-
furter.' Justice Douglas stated that the government agent's sup-
plying an essential ingredient of an illegal drug "made the United
States an active participant in the unlawful activity."' 7 Mr. Justice
Stewart flatly took the position that the entrapment doctrine pro-
hibits "unlawful government activity in instigating crime.""5
45. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
46. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
47. 411 U.S. at 436-38.
48. 411 U.S. at 442. Following the Russell decision, the federal courts of appeals adhered
to the majority's reaffirmation of the Sorrells-Sherman formulation of the entrapment de-
fense focusing on the predisposition of the accused. See note 30 supra.
The Second Circuit in one instance, although reversing a conviction based on lack of federal
jurisdiction, condemned the government's misconduct in its investigation leading to the
indictment. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). The Archer case involved
falsely charging a government agent with unlawful possession of a weapon thereby providing
an opportunity for the solicitation of a bribe from the agent by state law enforcement officials.
As a consequence the state official was charged with bribery. In Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46
A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), aff'd on other grounds, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45,
369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975), the court upheld similar conduct by a special state prosecutor. An
undercover agent was arrested on a false criminal charge. A second undercover agent asked
a federal judge to help the first agent to obtain a favorable result in the state criminal case.
The federal judge then testified before a state grand jury. He was indicted for perjury with
respect to his conversations with the second agent.
In Russell, Justice Rehnquist noted that law enforcement conduct might be so outrageous
as to constitute a violation of due process. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32
(1973). In this context, he cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 411 U.S. at 432. In
Rochin, the Court reversed a narcotics conviction on the ground that 'due process had been
violated by police forceable entry into the room of the accused, the violent seizure of his
person, and the forceable extraction of the narcotic from his stomach. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Rochin was decided at a time when, although the fourth amendment was applicable to the
states under Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the rule excluding illegally seized evi-
dence was not so applicable. The exclusionary rule was made applicable to the states by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court later limited Rochin to circumstances involv-
ing coercion, violence or brutality. In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), although the
police had made repeated illegal entries into the home of the accused to install and move a
hidden microphone, and in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), despite the police
removal of blood from the unconscious accused, the Court declined to find a violation of due
process. As a consequence, it is arguable that only police misconduct which involves coer-
cion, violence or brutality to the accused violates due process.
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In 1976, Hampton v. United States9 presented the United States
Supreme Court with the issue of improper law enforcement conduct.
No guidance was given regarding the due process standard to be
applied to such conduct because the Court did not arrive at a major-
ity opinion. In Hampton, petitioner was convicted of selling a drug
to a government agent which had been supplied to him by another
government agent. Hampton did not allege entrapment but claimed
that government conduct violated due process thereby barring his
conviction." Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White, rejected Hampton's due process claim. Due process
"come[s] into play only when the Government activity in question
violates some protected right" of the accused, not when law enforce-
ment officers merely act in concert with a defendant.5 Justice
Rehnquist did not explain what he meant by a "protected right."5
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun agreed that Hamp-
ton's conviction should be affirmed based on the principles enun-
ciated in Russell,13 but disagreed with what he viewed as the
plurality's position. That is, a conviction obtained by fundamen-
In a series of cases, the Second Circuit has interpreted Russell to mean that only law
enforcement misconduct which involves brutality to the accused violates due process. In
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), the court held that the unlawful
overseas seizure and return for trial of a fugitive under circumstances of torture and brutality
violated due process. The court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had
held in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), that to
bring a defendant within the criminal court's jurisdiction by "forcible abduction" was not a
violation of due process. 500 F.2d at 271-72. The Second Circuit theorized that the United
States Supreme Court would probably overrule Ker and Frisbie as a result of the evolution
of constitutional doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in the 1960's. 500 F.2d at 275.
In two decisions, United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gangler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), and United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second
Circuit, again relying upon Russell and Rochin, held that, although the fugitive in each case
had been unlawfully seized outside of the jurisdiction of the trial court and returned for trial
by government agents, no due process violation had occurred in the absence of brutality by
government agents. In the year that the Second Circuit decided Lujan and Lira, the Supreme
Court in dicta, approved its prior holdings in Ker and Frisbie in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 119 (1975).
Significantly, in Russell, Justice Rehnquist's finding that due process was not violated
rested not on the absence of police brutality but, rather, on the ground that the government
conduct was not fundamentally unfair. 411 U.S. at 431-32.
49. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
50. Id. at 489.
51. 425 U.S. at 490.
52. For the possible meanings of "protected right" see text accompanying notes 89-90
infra.
53. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
44 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
tally unfair police conduct would never be reversed by the Court
on due process grounds." According to Justice Powell, the entrap-
ment cases which the Court had considered did not involve law
enforcement conduct which violated due process standards. "5 There-
fore, the Court in the future may be confronted with government
abuses violating due process standards." Theoretically, the pre-
disposition of the defendant could be outweighed by due process
principles and cause a reversal of a conviction.
There was a dissenting opinion based on the view of entrapment
expressed by Justice Roberts57 and Frankfurter."' Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented, and urged
that the conviction should be reversed because the conviction in-
volved the sale of contraband provided to the defendant by a
government agent." Since there was an adequate ground for rever-
sal, it was unnecessary to determine whether or not due process had
been violated.10
54. 425 U.S. at 491, 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated:
The plurality. . . says that the concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the guar-
- antee of due process would never prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant,
regardless of the outrageousness of police behavior in light of the surrounding circum-
stances.
I do not understand Russell or earlier cases delineating the predisposition-focused
defense of entrapment to have gone so far, and there was no need for them to do so. In
those cases the Court was confronted with specific claims of police 'overinvolvement'
in criminal activity involving contraband. Disposition of these claims did not require
the court to consider whether overinvolvement of Government agents in contraband
offenses could ever reach such proportions as to bar conviction of a predisposed defen-
dant as a matter of due process law. Nor have we had occasion yet to confront Govern-
ment overinvolvement in areas outside the realm of contraband offenses. . . . In these
circumstances, I am unwilling to conclude that an analysis other than one limited to
predisposition would never be appropriate under due process principles.
Id. at 492-93. In mentioning that the Court had not yet dealt with government "overinvolve-
ment" in areas other than contraband crimes, Justice Powell cited United States v. Archer,
486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973). 425 U.S. at 493. See note 48 supra & note 98 infra.
55. 425 at 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
58. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
59. 425 U.S. at 500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting). In a footnote to his dissent, Justice Brennan stated:
"For present purposes it would be sufficient to adopt this rule under our supervisory power
and leave to another day whether it ought to be made applicable to the States under the
Due Process Clause." Id. at 500 n.4.
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Hampton is the United States Supreme Court's latest word on
entrapment. Despite decades of entrapment controversy, the Court
has consistently reaffirmed the Sorrells focus on predisposition. By
contrast, the availability of due process as an alternative to entrap-
ment is unclear. In 1973, the majority view was that conviction of a
predisposed defendant by fundamentally unfair police conduct vio-
lates due process. In 1976, this view disappeared and a plurality
view emerged that due process is violated only by police conduct
which infringes a protected right of the predisposed defendant.
III. The New York View of Entrapment and the Due Process
Alternative
The entrapment controversy in which the United States Supreme
Court has been embroiled for several decades has had no analogue
in New York. Entrapment was not a judicially recognized doctrine
in New York' until 1967 when it became a statutorily defined de-
fense to a criminal charge."2 The statutory formulation of the doc-
trine63 is based upon the definition laid down in Sorrells and
Sherman,"' focusing on the predisposition of the accused to commit
the crime charged.
In People v. Isaacson,"' the New York Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction of a defendant, who was predisposed to commit the
crime, on the ground that the conviction was obtained by law en-
forcement conduct violative of due process. 6 Defendant, a resident
of Pennsylvania with no prior criminal record, was convicted of
61. People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274 (1904); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975)
(practice commentary).
62. 1965 N.Y. Laws, ch. 1030 (effective September 1, 1967); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05
(McKinney 1975).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975) provides:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by
a public servant, . . . seeking to obtain evidence against himfor purpose of criminal
prosecution, and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create
a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise
disposed to commit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means
active inducement or encouragement. Conduct merely affording a person an opportun-
ity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
Id.
64. People v. Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351, cert. denied, 407
U.S. 923 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975) (practice commentary).
65. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
66. The trial court rejected Isaacson's entrapment defense. Id. at 518, 378 N.E.2d at 81,
406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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selling cocaine to a state police informant in New York State. 7 The
informant, a drug user and seller, cooperated with the police only
after his arrest on a felony drug charge and a brutal beating by a
state police officer." With police knowledge, the informant indiscri-
minately telephoned various persons for the purpose of arranging
drug sales to them, thereby providing opportunities for arrests by
the police." One of the persons called was the defendant. 0 After
several telephone calls and despite informant's pleas for sympathy
and entreaties of friendship, the defendant refused to procure co-
caine for the informant.7 Eventually, the defendant agreed to sup-
ply the requested drug but only in Pennsylvania." However, the
proposed situs of the sale occurred in New York State as a result of
the informant's misrepresentations." When the defendant arrived
at the agreed place, he was arrested by the New York State Police.7"Judge Cooke, writing for the majority, held that the conduct of
the State Police violated the New York State Constitution's due
process clause." In his view, the Supreme Court in United States
v. Russell" and Hampton v. United States77 did not preclude such
a result although the defendant in Isaacson was predisposed to com-
mit the crime.7" According to Judge Cooke, due process involves that
67. Id. at 514, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
68. Id. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16.
69. Id. at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 517, 378 N.E.2d at'80-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
73. Id. at 517-18, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
74. Id. at 518, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
75. Id. at 519-25, 378 N.E.2d at 82-85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718-22. Judge Cooke stated that
"[lIf course, under our own State due process clause (N.Y. State Const. art. I, § 6), this
court may impose higher standards than those held to be necessary by the Supreme Court
under the corresponding Federal constitutional provision (see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
719; see, generally, Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489)."44 N.Y.2d at 519-20, 378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718. Signifi-
cantly, in his due process analysis, Judge Cooke discussed both Supreme Court and New York
decisions dealing with due process. 44 N.Y.2d at 519-23, 378 N.E.2d 82-83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
719-20. It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court will not review a state court
judgment based upon an adequate and independent nonfederal ground. Murdock v. Memp-
his, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1875); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53 (1908);
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935); see also A.L. STEmRN & E. GRESSMAN,"
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 230-32 (5th ed. 1978).
76. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
77. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
78. 44 N.Y.2d at 519, 378 N.E.2d at 81-82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
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"'fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice'"
and, accordingly, due process requires the courts to prevent convic-
tions based upon police conduct violative of "cherished principles
of law and order."'70
Judge Cooke suggested four factors to determine police conduct
violative of due process standards. 0 They were whether (1) the po-
lice manufactured a crime which would not otherwise have occurred
or were merely involved in ongoing criminal activity; (2) the police
engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of
justice; (3) the defendant was reluctant to commit the crime yet
overcome by humanitarian appeals, or temptation to exorbitant
gain or by persistent solicitation; and (4) the police were motivated
solely by a desire to obtain a conviction with no thought of prevent-
ing further crime or protecting the public.8 According to Judge
Cooke, no one of the suggested factors should be determinative but
each should be viewed "in the context of proper law enforcement
objectives-the prevention of crime and the apprehension of viola-
tors, rather than the encouragement of and participation in sheer
lawlessness."8
Judge Cooke applied the four criteria to the facts and concluded
that due process had been violated.s He found that the defendant
was not engaged in ongoing criminal activity; the crime would not
have been committed but for the brutal state police treatment of the
informant which motivated him to induce the defendant to commit
the crime; and the sole police aim was conviction of anyone, and not
regard for the protection of the New York public.u
Although New York is statutorily committed to the Sorrells defi-
nitional predisposition focus of entrapment, its highest court judi-
cially declared that conviction of a predisposed defendant by funda-
mentally unfair conduct violates due process.
79. Id. at 520-21, 378 N.E.2d at 82-83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (quoting People v. Leyra,
302 N.Y. 353, 364, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1951)).
80. 44 N.Y.2d at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 44 N.Y.2d at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 83-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. Judge Gabrielli, in
dissent, argued that no due process violation was involved because no independent consti-
tutional right of the defendant had been violated. 44 N.Y.2d at 527, 378 N.E.2d at 87, 406
N.Y.S.2d at 723 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting). The vote for reversal was five to two.
84. 44 N.Y.2d at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 83-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
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IV. Critique of the Two Views of Entrapment and the Due
Process Alternative
For the United States Supreme Court85 and the New York Court
of Appeals,8" entrapment is the governmental instigation of the com-
mission of a crime by a person otherwise not predisposed to commit
the crime. In both the federal and New York jurisdictions,87 police
conduct which does not constitute entrapment may, nevertheless,
violate due process.
A. The Due Process Alternative in the United States Supreme
Court
At present, the status of the due process alternative in the
Supreme Court is not clear. In Russell, Justice Rehnquist held the
government conduct not to be violative of an "independent consti-
tutional right" of the defendant and therefore not violative of due
process. As examples of an "independent constitutional right," the
Justice mentioned the fourth amendment guarantee against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and the fifth amendment guarantee
against coerced confessions. He stated that due process focuses on
government conduct which is fundamentally unfair or is shocking
to a universal sense of justice." As a consequence, government con-
duct might be violative of due process through neither the fourth nor
fifth amendments were violated.
Under the Hampton analysis, a due process evaluation is required
only when government conduct violates a "protected right" of the
accused."9 Justice Rehnquist, however, did not define the term.
The term may be the equivalent to his "independent constitutional
right" in Russell. If that is true, only government conduct which
violates the fourth or fifth amendments or perhaps, other specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights,9 offends due process. Thus, the
Russell due process criterion of fundamental fairness has changed
to the Hampton due process criterion requiring a violation of one of
the first ten amendments.
85. See text accompanying notes 18-19, 27 & 39-41 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 39-44, 49-51 & 66 supra.
88. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
89. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
90. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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The Hampton due process criterion does not correspond with the
Court's traditional view that the test for due process is fundamental
fairness." Justice Rehnquist did not mention decisions of the
Court declaring that due process is violated by fundamentally un-
fair police conduct of pre-arraignment identification procedures
though no violation of the fourth or fifth amendment was involved
in such procedures.2 If due process were equivalent to fourth or fifth
amendment rights, due process would be superfluous since"such
rights are already constitutionally protected.
,. In Hampton, only two other Justices agreed with Justice Rehn-
quist's due process analysis.93 If presented with fundamentally
unfair government conduct in the future, the Court would probably
reverse on due process grounds. In such a case, the Court could well
be guided by Judge Cooke's due process analysis in Isaacson."
B. The Due Process Alternative in New York
In Isaacson, Judge Cooke adopted the Russell fundamental fair-
ness approach in his formulation of the due process alternative. 5
The Judge refused to limit due process to Justice Rehnquist's
Hampton search for violation of an independent constitutional
right. Judge Cooke, held that convictions predicated on police con-
duct offensive to principles of law and order violate due process."
91. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
92. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
the Supreme Court held that the police conduct of pre-arraignment identification procedures
in each case did not violate due process because the procedures were not fundamentally
unfair. In Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), the Court reversed the conviction because
the identification procedures were fundamentally unfair and, accordingly, violated due pro-
cess. In none of the three cases did the issue of due process violation turn on a violation of
the fourth or fifth amendments or, for that matter, on a violation of any other right guaran-
teed by the first ten amendments. In fact, the Court in Kirby specifically held that pre-
arraignment indentification procedures do not involve the fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory'self-incrimination. 406 U.S. 687.
93. See text accompanying notes 53-61 supra. 'i
94. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
95. See text accompanying note 79 supra. Judge Cooke rejected a Rochin brutality limita-
tion of due process. 44 N.Y.2d at 519-22, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718-20 (1978). See note 48 supra.
Judge Cooke referred to Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965). In Raley, the Court found that due process had been violated by conviction of a
defendant for exercising a constitutional privilege which the state had represented the defen-
dant possessed. 360 U.S. 437-40. In Cox, the Court held that due process had been violated
by conviction in a case where the state misrepresented the scope of the law to the defendant.
379 U.S. 569-71.
96. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
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This is a logical affirmation in due process terms of Justice Bran-
deis' condemnation, in Olmstead, of the government's committing
crime to convict a private person."
There are types of law enforcement conduct involving criminality
which might not violate due process under the four criteria 8 set up
by Judge Cooke in Isaacson. Such conduct would involve law en-
forcement use of criminal activity as a means of achieving a convic-
tion. Conceivably, the defendant could be involved in ongoing crim-
inal activity and might be amenable to commit the crime charged,
and yet the police could be motivated in their criminal activity by
a desire to protect the public. Under Judge Cooke's due process
criteria, due process would not be violated where only one of the
criteria, for example, police criminality would have been satisfied.
In the Judge's formulation, all four would have to be taken into
account."
Such a conclusion would justify Justice Brandeis' fear that, in
the administration of criminal justice, the end does justify a crimi-
nal means. Acceptance by the courts of government criminality
would classify it as fundamentally fair and as part and parcel of
97. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
98. Some examples are prosecution of the "boss" of a murder ring because of a murder
committed by an undercover police officer at the boss' direction and with the knowledge or
consent of the officer's superiors; prosecution of robbers as accomplices of an undercover
police agent who robbed at the behest of his superiors; prosecution of a woman for engaging
in sex for a fee with an undercover police officer who did so under orders of his superiors; or
the federal government's instigation of the arrest and prosecution in state court of an under.
cover agent on a false charge thereby providing an opportunity for solicitation of a bribe from
a state law enforcement official, and the prosecution of the state official for bribery. See note
48 supra.
The robbery example was suggested as a hypothetical in United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d
670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973). It is assumed that the prosecution would seek a conviction of the
robbers on the basis of the testimony of the police agent who had participated in the robbery.
Here, then, the prosecution would be relying on police criminality for purpose of conviction.
The last example constitutes the essential facts in United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670
(2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit condemned the government's conduct but reversed for lack
of federal jurisdiction. See note 48 supra. In Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d
513 (1974), aff'd on other grounds, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975),
the appellate division refused to dismiss an indictment based on facts similar to Archer. In
Nigrone, the appellate division, by a vote of three to two, refused to dismiss the indictment
for perjury on the ground that the indicting grand jury was aware of the special prosecutor's
subordination of perjury before the first grand jury. The court of appeals affirmed on proce-
dural grounds and therefore did not reach the issue of prosecutorial criminality. In the au-
thor's view the case was wrongly decided. The special prosecutor used criminal means to
achieve the accused's prosecution and thereby violated due process. See text accompanying
notes 104-05 infra.
99. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
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our principles of law and order. In short, convictions obtained by
means of law enforcement criminality would be offensive to due
process. 100
Not every case in which police criminality is involved would war-
rant reversal on due process grounds. For example, assume that, in
Isaacson, 10 1 the only police misconduct was the criminal assault
upon the informant, and that the informant later cooperated with
the police for reasons other than the assault. A resulting conviction
of Isaacson would not have been achieved by means of police crimi-
nality. His conviction would not be predicated upon fundamentally
unfair means and, consequently, due process would not be violated.
On the other hand, if the state police had tortured the informant
with the intention of causing him to induce Isaacson to commit a
crime, and the informant's activity was instrumental to that end,
there would be a violation of due process. Under such a test, police
criminality would violate due process only if it were the means by
which the conviction was achieved. Such a requirement would serve
as clear warning to law enforcement officials that commission of
crimes by the police for the purpose of achieving a conviction would
not be tolerated by the courts.
. Judge Cooke's four criteria should not apply where the conviction
was obtained by law enforcement criminality. Where police miscon-
duct does not involve criminality, the four criteria 0 2 should serve as
a useful starting point for due process evaluation. However, use of
the criteria should always be consonant with the principle that due
process involves fundamental fairness and observance of law and
order.
V. Conclusion
Four decades ago, the United States Supreme Court held that
entrapment was a defense available to a defendant in a criminal
case. It is a doctrine of limited scope, available only to an accused
100. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 673 (2d Cir. 1973) (dicta).
101. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 515, 378 N.E.2d 78, 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715
(1978).
102. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra. The third criteria, focusing on police
instigation of the defendant to commit the crime, appears to be the Roberts-Frankfurter
entrapment doctrine in modern due process dress. This was expressly recognized by Judge
Cooke. 44 N.Y.2d at 524, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721. However, in Judge Cooke's
due process formulation, it is not the sole criterion. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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not predisposed to commit the crime charged. Over the years certain
members of the Court sought to broaden the scope of entrapment
by a formulation focusing objectively on the conduct of the police.
Such attempts have consistently failed.In this decade, a majority of the Court held that conviction of a
predisposed defendant by fundamentally unfair police methods vio-
lates due process. This majority due process formulation is now
uncertain. In the last entrapment case before the Court, a plurality
declared that due process is violated only by police conduct which
infringes a fourth or fifth amendment right or, perhaps, some other
guarantee of the first ten amendments to the Constitution.
Under the plurality's due process formulation, the Isaacson case
would not have involved a due process violation. There is no evi-
dence that Isaacson's rights under the Bill of Rights 0 3 were violated.
Moreover, a conviction obtained by criminal means would not of-
fend due process in the absence of a violation of such rights. Thus,
the plurality due process formulation is dangerous because much
government lawlessness would lie outside its ambit.
New York has refused to follow the Supreme Court's plurality due
process definition. The New York Court of Appeals has firmly held
that conviction of a predisposed accused by fundamentally unfair
police methods violates due process. It has formulated due process
criteria which focus on government lawlessness in obtaining con-
victions.
New York's due process emphasis on government lawlessness is
preferable to the Supreme Court's plurality due process focus on a
fourth or fifth amendment violation. Under the New York view,
conviction of a predisposed defendant by fundamentally unfair gov-
ernment methods would offend due process though no fourth or fifth
amendment was involved. The New York due process formulation
has one possible defect: conviction of a predisposed defendant by
criminal government means would not always violate due process.
Government criminality for the purpose of obtaining convictions
should be sufficient to constitute a violation of due process.
The Hampton plurality has caused uncertainty as to the status
of due process as a remedy available to the predisposed defendant
in the federal courts. Although Justice Powell concurred in the
103. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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affirmance of Hampton's conviction, he disagreed with the plural-
ity's due process formulation. Justice Brennan, in dissenting, dis-
agreed with the plurality's definition of due process, but he also
disagreed with the affirmance of Hampton's conviction. In view of
this disagreement among the members of the Court, a majority of
the Court would probably reverse the conviction of a predisposed
defendant on due process grounds where the conviction was ob-
tained by fundamentally unfair means. If these facts are presented
to the Court, New York's Isaacson decision may serve as a guidepost
for setting due process standards.

